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eMudhra weak keys: Cloudflare logs 22,000 handshake attempts after CA flaw

Cloudflare says it saw about 22,000 attempted TLS handshakes using eMudhra's eight weak keys, and that all high-priority systems are now patched.

eMudhra weak keys: Cloudflare logs 22,000 handshake attempts after CA flaw

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Cloudflare has recorded about 22,000 attempted TLS handshakes using eMudhra’s eight weak intermediate keys, roughly a week after the certificate authority’s flaw became public. The company disclosed the figure in a follow-up blog post published October 30, 2026, tracking exploitation and patching.

The problem surfaced on October 19, when Cloudflare learned that eMudhra, trusted to generate key material, had produced keys that were trivially guessable. In Cloudflare’s words, where eMudhra was supposed to pick a 115-digit number, “they picked the number 4.” The other seven keys were similarly weak: 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230 and 237.

What makes this case different from past CA compromises is who can exploit it. Cloudflare notes that the affected intermediate private keys “could be recovered almost instantly by anyone from the public certificates themselves.” That means anyone can recreate the signing keys and mint certificates for any domain that an unpatched client, one not enforcing Certificate Transparency, would accept.

Two-thirds of the attempts hit test sites

To measure exposure, Cloudflare added logging to Pingora, the proxy handling most of its outbound connections. The logging finished rolling out on October 21. Of the roughly 22,000 attempted handshakes seen by the time of writing, two-thirds were fetches of test sites such as emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com, which Cloudflare had referenced in its earlier developer guidance.

On its own infrastructure, Cloudflare says all high-priority systems have been patched, with a small number of confirmed low-impact tickets still being worked on. Patching began October 19, when customer origin-facing Pingora proxies were changed within hours to reject the vulnerable keys. An AI-assisted scan of the source code identified other systems trusting the keys within four hours.

Questions remain over eMudhra’s own handling

According to Cloudflare, eMudhra has announced it is exiting the public CA business and has blamed a mistake in a key generation script, but has not shared the script. Cloudflare also says eMudhra signed a certificate revocation list with what may have been a correctly generated key, then corrected it to be signed with the weak key. The post calls for clarity on the role of auditors and cross signers.

If you run a system that trusts eMudhra intermediates, Cloudflare’s guidance is to reject the eight weak keys and to enforce Certificate Transparency on clients. The full technical write-up, including the exploitation evidence and patching timeline, is available on Cloudflare’s blog.

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